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ACCOUNTANTS AND THE DYNAMICS OF DUTY*
THOMAS J. SHROYERt
The area of accountant's liability is experiencing many complex
changes. Questions concerning the standard of performance required
of the accounting profession have necessitated a thorough digest ana-
lyzing established standards as well as standards recently set forward
by the courts. Mr. Shroyer surveys the common law basis for claims
against accountants in their ever-increasing role in substantialfinan-
cial transations. Of special significance is the abrogation of the ac-
countant's privity defense in a growing minority of jurisdictions.
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INTRODUCTION
Fostered by an explosion in adverse litigation, the profes-
sion of accounting has recently been the subject of increased
judicial scrutiny. This development is largely reflective of the
central role the profession has assumed in commerce and fi-
nance. As a result, the profession faces heightened exposure
to the claims of non-clients. Indeed, jurisprudential views to-
ward the profession, newly adopted in a minority of states,
stress the profession's assumed role in safeguarding the integ-
rity of financial information in holding accountants liable to
every "reasonably foreseeable" user of financial statements.
This represents an important break from the immunity ac-
countants have traditionally enjoyed from the claims of non-
clients. In the view of accountants, these recent inroads on the
privity defense are unfairly based on erroneous beliefs about
the functions of the profession.
This Article will survey the common law basis for claims
against accountants and the abrogation of the accountants'
privity defense in a minority of jurisdictions.I The limitations
on breach of contract claims against professionals in Minne-
sota, the elements of negligence and misrepresentation cases,
and the applicability of comparative fault principles will be dis-
cussed. Specific consideration will also be given to the mea-
sure of damages and application of the "economic loss"
doctrine in claims against accountants. The ferment surround-
1. This article will not deal with the numerous federal and state statutory bases
for claims against accountants. For an introduction to statutory claims commonly
raised against accountants, see generally R. GORMLEY, THE LAW OF ACCOUNTANTS
AND AUDITORS: RIGHTS, DUTIES AND LIABILITIES §§ 7.1-17.08 (1981); MILLER &
BRADY, CPA LIABILITY: MEETING THE CHALLENGE (1986); Gruenbaum and Steinberg,
Accountants' Liability and Responsibility: Securities, Criminal and Common Law, 13 Loy.
L.A.L. REV. 247 (1980).
[Vol. 14
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ing the privity defense will then be analyzed in the context of
the Minnesota decision of Bonhiver v. Graff.
2
I. BREACH OF CONTRACT
The general rule in Minnesota is that a professional is not
liable, ex contractu, for breach of performance warranties or for
breach of contract, even to his clients.3 This prohibition is
long-standing and is the majority rule. 4 The rationale for the
rule is:
Architects, doctors, engineers, attorneys and others deal in
somewhat inexact sciences and are continually called upon
to exercise their skilled judgment in order to anticipate and
provide for random factors which are incapable of precise
measurement. The indeterminate nature of these factors
makes it impossible for professional service people to gauge
them with complete accuracy in every instance. Thus, doc-
tors cannot promise that every operation will be successful;
a lawyer can never be certain that a contract he drafts is
without latent ambiguity; and an architect cannot be certain
that a structural design will interact with natural forces as
anticipated. Because of the inescapable possibility of error
which inheres in these services, the law has traditionally re-
quired, not perfect results, but rather the exercise of that
skill and judgment which can be reasonably expected from
similarly situated professionals. 5
Although accountants have not been specifically included in
the list of professionals protected by the rule, they have been
characterized as professionals in other decisions. 6 Since ac-
countants are held to the "same standard" of care as doctors
and lawyers, 7 there is no logical basis upon which to deny ac-
2. 311 Minn. 111, 248 N.W.2d 291 (1976).
3. See City of Moundsview v. Walijarvi, 263 N.W.2d 420 (Minn. 1978) (cited
with approval in Waldor Pump & Equip. Co. v. Orr-Schelen-Mayeron & Assoc., Inc.,
386 N.W.2d 375 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986)).
4. See Waliarvi, 263 N.W.2d at 423; 'aldor Pump, 386 N.W.2d at 376-77.
5. See Waldor Pump, 386 N.W.2d at 376-77 (quoting Walijarvi, 263 N.W.2d at
424).
6. See, e.g., Vernon J. Rockier & Co. v. Glickman, Isenberg, Lurie & Co., 273
N.W.2d 647 (Minn. 1978).
7. Id. at 650. "Accountants owe their clients a duty of reasonable care; they
must exercise the average ability and skill of those engaged in the profession." Id.
(citations omitted). Breach of that duty is defined as the failure of the accountants to
discharge that duty with reasonable care. Id. "Plaintiff in an accounting malpractice
action must prove the elements delineated in Christy v. Saliterman, 288 Minn. 144,
150, 179 N.W.2d 288, 293 (1970)." Id.
19881
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countants the protection of the rule. Accordingly, accountants
should not normally be subject to liability, under contract prin-
ciples, for breach of contract under Minnesota law.
However, where a professional gives an express warranty
concerning the results of his efforts, a breach of contract action
will lie.8 For example, an accountant who expressly repre-
sented that he would detect "any irregularities" was held liable
to his audit client, on breach of contract, for failure to detect
employee defalcation. 9 Therefore, where an accountant ex-
pressly warrants a particular result, he can be sued for breach
of contract.
This raises the question of whether a written engagement
agreement between an accountant and client gives rise to an
actionable express warranty. Typically, engagement agree-
ments require the accountant to perform his duties in compli-
ance with generally accepted professional standards. 10 May an
accountant be sued for breach of contract on a showing of
deviation from those standards? There are no Minnesota cases
on point, but it has been held at common law that a promise to
perform services with due professional care is not an express
warranty of a "specific result.""
There are important reasons for plaintiffs to assert an action
ex contractu against an accountant. These include the possible
elimination of the need for expert witness testimony,' 2 avoid-
8. Waliarvi, 263 N.W.2d at 422-23 (architect guaranteed "water tightness" of
basement).
9. City of East Grand Forks v. Steele, 121 Minn. 296, 297-99, 141 N.W. 181,
181-82 (1913).
10. An audit engagement letter typically states as follows:
Our examination will be made in accordance with generally accepted audit-
ing standards, and will include tests of the accounting records and such
other audit procedures as we consider necessary to enable us to render an
opinion on the fairness of your financial statements. It is not contemplated
that we will make a detailed examination of all transactions such as would be
necessary to disclose any defalcations or irregularities which may have oc-
curred. We will, however, advise you of any findings which appear unusual
or abnormal, and we will also review your system of internal controls.
J. BURTON, R. PALMER & R. KAY, HANDBOOK OF ACCOUNTING AND AUDITING 16-4
(1981).
11. In re Investors Funding Corp., 523 F. Supp. 533, 546 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). The
court applied New York common law which holds that even an express promise to
follow generally accepted accounting principles [GAAP] is not a guarantee of a "spe-
cific result." Id.
12. See L.B. Laboratories, Inc. v. Mitchell, 39 Cal. 2d 56, 59, 244 P.2d 385, 386
(1952) (expert testimony to prove negligence as for an action for malpractice is un-
necessary in action for breach of contract).
[Vol. 14
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ance of the comparative fault statute,1 3 and the possible cir-
cumvention of the privity defense on a claim of third party
beneficiary status.' 4 On the other hand, the contract measure
of damages might be more restrictive than the measure of tort
damages, since Minnesota does follow the rule of Hadley v.
Baxendale. t
5
13. See Lesmeister v. Dilly, 330 N.W.2d 95, 101-02 (Minn. 1983). The court
noted that although the comparative fault statute expressly includes negligence and
breach of warranty, MINN. STAT. § 604.01, subd. 1(a) (1980), it appears that the stat-
ute was not intended to apply to contract cases. First, contract law has never spoken
in terms of fault but rather recovery of the expectancy or benefit of the bargain.
Second, the statute is derived from the Uniform Comparative Fault Act. See also
Mike's Fixtures, Inc. v. Bombard's Access Floor Systems, Inc., 354 N.W.2d 837, 839-
40 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984) (which quotes Lesmeister, 330 N.W.2d at 101-02). The com-
parative fault statute continues to expressly include breach of warranty. MINN. STAT.
§ 604.01, subd. la (1986); Steenson, The Anatomy of Products Liability in Minnesota: Prin-
ciples of Loss Allocation, 6 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 243, 334 (1980).
14. See Cretex Cos., Inc. v. Construction Leaders, Inc., 342 N.W.2d 135, 139
(Minn. 1984) (a third party beneficiary can only recover if shown to be an "intended
beneficiary" under an "intent to benefit" or "duty owed" test); Marker v. Greenberg,
313 N.W.2d 4, 5 (Minn. 1981). The court stated: "The general rule in legal malprac-
tice is that an attorney is liable for professional negligence only to the person with
whom the attorney has an attorney-client relationship and not, in the absence of spe-
cial circumstances such as fraud or improper motive, to anyone else." Id. See also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 302 (1979):
Intended and Incidental Beneficiaries
(1) Unless otherwise agreed between promisor and promisee, a bene-
ficiary of a promise is an intended beneficiary if recognition of a right to
perfomance in the beneficiary is appropriate to effectuate the intention
of the parties and either
(a) the performance of the promise will satisfy an obligation of
the promisee to pay money to the beneficiary; or
(b) the circumstances indicate that the promisee intends to give
the beneficiary the benefit of the promised performance.
(2) An incidental beneficiary is a beneficiary who is not an intended
beneficiary.
Cf Buchman Plumbing Co. v. Regents of University of Minnesota, 298 Minn. 328,
333, 215 N.W.2d 479, 483 (1974) (a third party may sue on a contract made for his
direct benefit). Contra Raritan River Steel Co. v. Cherry, Bekaert & Holland, 79 N.C.
App. 81, 88, 339 S.E.2d 62, 67 (1986). The court stated: "We find no compelling
basis for distinguishing accountants from other professionals in this regard .... [W]e
thus hold that lack of privity of contract is not a bar to actions by third parties against
certified public accountants for negligent misrepresentation [of a client's financial
condition]."
15. 9 Ex. 341, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1954); see Lesmeister, 330 N.W.2d at 103. The
court stated: "In addition, non-breaching parties should recover damages sustained
by reason of the breach which arose naturally from the breach or could reasonably be
supposed to have been contemplated by the parties when making the contract as the
probable result of the breach." Id.; see also Frank v. Jansen, 303 Minn. 86, 95-96, 226
N.W.2d 739, 745 (1975) (Hadley v. Baxendale is still followed in this state).
19881
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II. NEGLIGENCE
A. General Elements
The accounting profession is held to the "same standard of
reasonable care as lawyers, doctors, architects, and other pro-
fessional people engaged in furnishing skilled services for
compensation." 1
6
B. Breach of Duty
It is well established that an accountant has a duty to use due
professional care in providing services to a client.17 "Reason-
able care" requires that an accountant "exercise the average
ability and skill of those engaged in that profession."' 8
The question of whether an accountant owes the plaintiff the
duty of due care is generally resolved by looking no further
than to see whether plaintiff is the client of the accountant.' 9
That is, an accountant owes the duty to his client. The matter
is considerably more complicated, however, where non-clients
are involved and the nature and scope of the duty owed to such
third parties is discussed below. 20
The establishment of the standard of due professional care
and its breach is ordinarily a matter for expert testimony.21
This is equally true in cases brought against accountants since
the arcane learning of the profession is beyond the ken of most
lay persons. 22
The main sources of professional standards for accountants
are the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants and
the Financial Accounting Standards Board. Accountants refer
collectivly to the standards these bodies publish as "generally
accepted accounting principles" (GAAP) and "generally ac-
cepted auditing standards" (GAAS). 23 Another source of the
16. Rockler, 273 N.W.2d at 650.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. See infra notes 108-11 and accompanying text.
21. See City of Eveleth v. Ruble, 302 Minn. 249, 254-55 & n.4, 225 N.W.2d 521,
525 & n.4 (1974).
22. See City of East Grand Forks v. Steele, 121 Minn. 296, 300-01, 141 N.W. 181,
183 (1913).
23. GAAP and GAAS are treated exhaustively in the following treatises: A. AFr-
ERMAN, ACCOUNTING AND AUDITING DISCLOSURE MANUAL (1987); A. AFTERMAN, COM-
PILATION AND REVIEW PRACTICE MANUAL (1985); BURTON & PALMER, HANDBOOK OF
[Vol. 14
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standard of care, often neglected, is the Code of Professional
Conduct. 24 The Code imposes affirmative duties on account-
ants to supervise associates,2 5 maintain independence, 26 take
reasonable tax positions, 27 and to generally comply with GAAP
and GAAS. 2 8 Finally, an accountant's formal engagement with
a client may establish the required standard of care for that
particular relationship.
29
Many courts have held that the standard of care which an
accountant owes is coterminous with GAAP and GAAS.
30
However, the courts have not immunized accountants from lia-
bility, despite literal compliance with GAAP or GAAS, where
compliance is overly formal and ignores practicalities. 3' In-
deed, criminal convictions of accountants under the federal
securties laws have been upheld without evidence of deviation
from the letter of GAAP or GAAS. 32 In Minnesota, expert tes-
ACCOUNTING & AUDITING (1981); D. CAUSEY, DUTIES AND LIABILITIES OF PUBLIC Ac-
COUNTANTS (1979); D. CAUSEY, THE TAX PRACTIONER (1984); DYKEMAN, FORENSIC AC-
COUNTING, THE ACCOUNTANT AS EXPERT WITNESS (1982); R. GORMLEY, THE LAW OF
ACCOUNTANTS AND AUDITORS: RIGHTS, DUTIES AND LIABILITIES (1981); KELLOGG,
How TO FIND NEGLIGENCE AND MISREPRESENTATIONS IN FINANCIAL STATEMENTS
(1983); MAUTZ, FUNDAMENTALS OF AUDITING (UMI 2d ed.); SULLIVAN, MONTGOMERY'S
AUDITING (1985).
24. MINN. R. 1100.3800 to .8000 (1987); Eizenstat & Speer, Accountants Profes-
sional Liability: Expanding Exposure, 1972 Fed'n of Ins. Couns.J. 7. Contra Wagenheim
v. Alexander Grant & Co., 19 Ohio App. 3d 7, 482 N.E.2d 955 (1983) (using Ohio
Administrative Code as evidence of an accountant's duty of confidentiality).
25. MINN. R. 1100.4200, subp. 2.
26. Id. 1100.4400.
27. Id. 1100, 4600.
28. Id. 1100.4800 & 1100.4900.
29. See Ryan v. Kanne, 170 N.W.2d 395, 404 (Iowa 1969).
30. See Isbell, An Overview of Accountants' Duties and Liabilities Under the Federal Secur-
ities Laws and a Closer Look at Whistle-Blowing, 35 OHIO ST. L.J. 261, 270-73 (1974); see
also Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643, 703 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (consid-
ering both S.E.C. requirements and accounting standards together); Shahmoon v.
General Dev. Corp., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,308 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (considering
S.E.C. rules and accounting together).
31. See Hochfelder v. Ernst & Ernst, 503 F.2d 1100, 1113-14 (7th Cir. 1974), rev'd
on other grounds, 425 U.S. 185 (1976); Herzfeld v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath &
Horwath, 378 F. Supp. 112, 121-22 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), aff'd in part, revd in part, 540
F.2d 27 (2d Cir. 1976); D. CAUSEY, DUTIES AND LIABILITIES, supra note 23, at 2-5
(discussion of § 10(b) liability).
32. See United States v. Simon, 425 F.2d 796, 805-06 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
397 U.S. 1006 (1970); United States v. Natelli, 527 F.2d 311, 320-26 (2d Cir. 1975).
In both cases, accountants were held to the performance of non-audit duties beyond
standards set by the AICPA where violations of the securities laws by their clients was
known or suspected. See also Note, United States v. Natelli: Extension of the Suspicious
Inquiry Rule to Unaudited Financial Statenents, 1 J. CORP. L. 519, 539 (1976) (Aatelli
1988]
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timony standing alone, without any formal regulation by
GAAP, has been found sufficient to establish the required level
of professional care and resulting liability. 33
Accountants often use disclaimers or limited certifications in
their engagement and opinion letters. This is viewed by ac-
countants as a clear way to alert clients and third parties to the
scope and nature of the services rendered and the limited na-
ture of the accountant's opinion. 34
Some courts have viewed accountants' disclaimers with dis-
favor. In Ryan v. Kanne,35 the accountants' disclaimer that the
company's financial reports were "unaudited" was not suffi-
cient to protect the accountant from negligence in the prepara-
tion of the report.3 6 Similarly, in Rhode Island Hospital Trust
National Bank v. Swartz, 37 it was held that the expression of
qualifications on an audit opinion letter was wholly inadequate
and misleading, because the qualifications failed to indicate the
true extent of knowledge and investigation conducted by the
accountant. 38
Like other professionals, accountants are not liable for an
honest error in judgment in choosing between accepted meth-
ods of practice.3 9 One court even went so far as to hold that
the good faith misinterpretation of a complex area of tax law
was not malpractice.40
C. Causation or Reliance
Accounting negligence cases often turn on the issue of
whether the plaintiff suffered loss as a result of malpractice.
Generally, the plaintiff has the burden of proving that he rea-
sonably relied upon the accountant's work product. 41 Simply
adopted a legal duty for accountants associated with unaudited financial statements
more stringent than the duty prescribed by the accounting profession).
33. See Bonhiver, 311 Minn. at 119, 248 N.W.2d at 297.
34. AICPA Professional Standards (CCH) § 509.45 (1982).
35. 170 N.W.2d 395 (Iowa 1969).
36. Id. at 404.
37. 455 F.2d 847 (4th Cir. 1972).
38. Id. at 851-52.
39. See Ouelette v. Subak, 391 N.W.2d 810, 815-16 (Minn. 1986); Cook v. Con-
nolly, 366 N.W.2d 287, 290-91 (Minn. 1985); Gammel v. Ernst & Ernst, 245 Minn.
249, 253-55, 72 N.W.2d 364, 368-71 (1955).
40. See Smith v. St. Paul Fire & Marine, 344 F. Supp. 555, 558-59 (M.D. La.),
rev'd, 471 F.2d 840 (5th Cir. 1972), on remand, 366 F. Supp. 1283, 1290 (M.D. La.
1973),aff'd, 500 F.2d 1131, 1131 (Sth Cir. 1974).
41. See Rockier, 273 N.W.2d at 650.
[Vol. 14
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put, this means that "but for" the accountant's advice or work,
the plaintiff would not have acted as he did.
42
In regard to this element, it is proper to consider the plain-
tiff's business expertise and the possibility that the plaintiff
would have acted as he did for some reason other than reliance
upon the accountant's advice. 43 For example, in Bunge Corp. v.
Eide,44 a creditor sued an accountant for the overvaluation of a
client's inventory. 45 The creditor alleged that it relied on the
inflated inventory valuation in lending money to the bor-
rower.46 The court ruled that the creditor was not entitled to
recovery, in part, because the creditor failed to follow prudent
lending policies and extended credit in order to avoid a loan
loss after it had learned that the borrower was in trouble.
47
Closely related to the "reasonable reliance" element is the
question of whether the Minnesota Comparative Fault Act
48
applies in an accounting malpractice action. The courts are
split on whether an accountant can raise his client's own ne-
ligence or fault as a defense.49 There are no Minnesota cases
on point, but it seems reasonable to predict that comparative
fault principles will be applied in almost all Minnesota cases in
view of the broad scope of the statute and its liberal applica-
tion by the courts. 50
42. Id.
43. Id. at 651-52.
44. 372 F. Supp. 1058 (D.N.D. 1974).
45. Id. at 1063.
46. Id. at 1064.
47. Id.
48. MINN. STAT. § 604.01 (1986).
49. See Menzel, The Defense of Contributory Negligence in Accountant's Malpractice Ac-
tions, 13 SETON HALL 292, 292 (1983); see also Hawkins, Professional Negligence Liability of
Public Accountants, 12 VAND. L. REV. 797, 809-11 (1959) (discussing types of cases in
which defense is raised).
Several courts permit application of comparative fault precepts. See, e.g., Cenco,
Inc. v. Seidman & Seidman, 686 F.2d 449, 456-57 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 880, 103 S.Ct. 177 (1982); Devco Premium Fin. Co. v. North River Ins. Co., 450
So. 2d 1216, 1220 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984); Capitol Mortgage Corp. v. Coopers &
Lybrand, 142 Mich. App. 531, 537, 369 N.W.2d 922, 925 (1985); Delmar Vineyard v.
Timmons, 486 S.W.2d 914, 921 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1972).
In other jurisdictions, the client's own fault is considered only where it contrib-
uted to the accountant's own error. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Glekel, 380 F. Supp. 1053,
1058 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Lincoln Grain, Inc. v. Coopers & Lybrand, 216 Neb. 433, 441,
345 N.W.2d 300, 306 (1984); National Sur. Corp. v. Lybrand, 256 A.D. 226, 236, 9
N.Y.S.2d 554, 563 (N.Y. App. Div. 1939).
50. Minnesota Statutes section 604.01, subdivision la, defines "fault" to include
assumption of risk, failure to avoid injury, and failure to mitigate damages. See
1988]
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D. Damages
The damages recoverable in tort are those which are the nat-
ural and proximate result of the defendant's misconduct. 51 A
matter of particular moment in accountant's tort cases is
whether an accountant can be held liable for "economic loss."
In Minnesota, limitations on the recoverability of economic
loss in tort actions have been considered in Superwood Corp. v.
Siemplekamp Corp.52 "Economic loss" has been defined as dam-
ages claims for inadequate value, cost of repair, and loss of
profits. 53 In an accounting malpractice action, consequential
economic loss might include profits lost by a business seller on
a sale avoided by the buyer due to an accountant's negligence,
losses incurred by a taxpayer forced to liquidate assets at an
improvident price to pay back taxes, or "prime rate" interest
income lost by a creditor on loans based on negligently pre-
pared financial statements. The primary purpose of the limita-
tions on the recoverability of economic loss is to shield a
defendant from unlimited liability for all economic conse-
quences of a negligent act, at least in a commercial or profes-
sional setting. 5
4
No Minnesota decisions have applied the Superwood doctrine
in an accounting negligence case. The doctrine has been con-
sidered in the context of negligence claims involving other
professions, with mixed results. In D &A Development Co. v. But-
ler,55 the plaintiff brought a negligence action against two ar-
chitects for failure to complete a warehouse on time. The
plaintiff sought to recover profits lost as a result of late per-
formance.56 In rejecting the claim for lost profits, the interme-
diate appellate court stated that "purely economic losses that
arise out of commercial transactions are not recoverable in
Florenzano v. Olson, 387 N.W.2d 168, 176 (Minn. 1986) (applying defense to negli-
gent misrepresentation cases); Radiske v. Minnesota Valley Breeder's Ass'n, 374
N.W.2d 745 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (defense applies to negligence and fraud claims
but not contract claims).
51. Johnson v. Gustafson, 201 Minn. 629, 634-35, 277 N.W. 252, 255 (1938).
52. 311 N.W.2d 159, 162-63 (Minn. 1982).
53. See Moorman Mfg. Co. v. National Tank Co., 91 111. 2d 69, 83, 435 N.E.2d
443, 449 (1982).
54. See LocalJoint Executive Board v. Stern, 98 Nev. 409, 411,651 P.2d 637, 638
(1982).
55. 357 N.W.2d 156 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984).
56. Id. at 157.
(Vol. 14
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negligence." 57 The court did not explain its ruling, which
clearly applied Superwood in an action for professional negli-
gence, and on a transaction not subject to the Uniform Com-
mercial Code.5
8
Recently, the potential value of D &A Development in limiting
recovery of economic losses in professional negligence cases
has been undermined by decisions of the Minnesota Court of
Appeals. 59 In Valley Farmers' Elevator v. Lindsay Bros. ,60 the court
stated that Minnesota "has long allowed negligence actions for
the recovery of economic losses resulting from the negligent
performance of professional services. '" 6 1 The court reasoned
that Superwood does not protect professional malpractice ac-
tions because the Uniform Commercial Code does not govern
the rendering of professional services. 62 Since persons injured
as a result of professional negligence therefore lack an implied
warranty remedy for resulting economic loss, they are allowed
to recover economic loss in tort actions against professionals.
63
In a later case, the court further undermined D &A Development
by characterizing the application of Superwood as dictum.64
Thus, under current interpretations of Superwood by the Minne-
sota Court of Appeals, accountants face exposure in damages
for pure "economic loss" in tort actions.
57. Id. at 158 (citing Minneapolis Soc'y of Fine Arts v. Parker-Klein Assocs. Ar-
chitects, Inc., 354 N.W.2d 816, 821 (Minn. 1984)); Superwood, 311 N.W.2d at 161 &
n.6.
58. See MINN. STAT. §§ 336.2-101 to .2-725 (1986).
59. See McCarthy Well Co. v. St. Peter Creamery, Inc., 389 N.W.2d 514 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1986) (economic damages recoverable on claim for negligent performance
of professional services); Waldor Pump, 386 N.W.2d at 377; Valley Farmers' Elevator
v. Lindsay Bros. Co., 380 N.W.2d 874 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
60. 380 N.W.2d 874 (citing City of Eveleth v. Ruble, 302 Minn. 249, 225 N.W.2d
521 (1974); Northern Petrochemical Co. v. Thorsen & Thorshov, Inc., 297 Minn.
118, 211 N.W.2d 159 (1973)).
61. Valley Farmers' Elevator, 380 N.W.2d at 877-78.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. See Waldor Pump, 386 N.W.2d at 377. However, this reasoning seems to ig-
nore the ability of commercially sophisticated clients to negotiate a contract with pro-
fessionals containing an express warranty of a specific result. See, e.g., Walijarvi, 263
N.W.2d at 423; Steele, 121 Minn. at 300, 141 N.W. at 182. Since Supenvood expressly
does not apply to transactions involving mere "consumers," 311 N.W.2d at 162, the
concern articulated by the court of appeals about the inability of those with weak
bargaining power to negotiate the requisite warranty with a professional seems mis-
placed. Valley Farmers' Elevator, 380 N.W.2d at 877-78.
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III. NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION
A. Essential Elements
As purveyors of representations of fact, accountants are
uniquely vulnerable to claims of misrepresentation. The first
element of a negligent misrepresentation claim against an ac-
countant is the furnishing of false information by the account-
ant during the course of his business, profession, or
employment. To be actionable, the information must also
have been supplied for the guidance of others in their business
and the accountant must have failed to exercise reasonable
care or competence in obtaining or communicating the infor-
mation. Of course, the plaintiff's reliance upon the informa-
tion must have been justified and that reliance had to have
been a direct cause of plaintiff's damage, consisting of actual
monetary loss. 6
5
The gravamen of a claim in negligent misrepresentation is
whether the accountant asserted a fact "of his own knowledge
without knowing whether it is true or false." 66 As explained in
the leading case of Florenzano v. Olson:
A misrepresentation is made negligently when the mis-
representer has not discovered or communicated certain in-
formation that the ordinary person in his or her position
would have discovered or communicated. Proof of the sub-
jective state of the misrepresenter's mind, whether by direct
evidence or by inference, is not needed to prove negli-
gence. Negligence is proved by measuring one's conduct
against an objective standard of reasonable care or
competence. 67
At the same time, no one is held to warrant the truth of all
statements made and a good faith, non-negligent mistake will
not establish misrepresentation under either a claim of fraudu-
lent or negligent misrepresentation. 68
B. Comparative Fault
The Minnesota Comparative Fault Act is applied in cases of
negligent misrepresentation, though it is not available to a de-
65. See Bonhiver, 311 Minn. at 121-22, 248 N.W.2d at 298-99; RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF TORTS § 552 (1977).
66. Florenzano, 387 N.W.2d at 174.
67. Id.
68. Id..
[Vol. 14
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fendant charged with fraudulent misrepresentation.69
C. Reliance
To satisfy the reliance element of a negligent misrepresenta-
tion case, the plaintiff must establish that his reliance was
reasonable. 70 The reasonableness of this reliance is measured
with reference to the "specific intelligence and experience" of
the plaintiff.7' This principle is important in accounting
malpractice cases, since claims against accountants frequently
involve plaintiffs who are educated, sophisticated, and exper-
ienced in business and finance.
D. Damages
As a general rule, a plaintiff suing in Minnesota for misrepre-
sentation is only entitled to out-of-pocket damages, any other
losses proximately caused by the deception before it was dis-
covered, plus expenses incurred in mitigation. 72 Out-of-
pocket damages are measured as the "difference between what
the plaintiff parted with.and what he got. It is therefore not a
question of what the plaintiff might have gained through the
transaction, but what he lost by reason of defendant's
deception."
73
There are exceptions to application of the out-of-pocket
damage measure in misrepresentation cases.74 For example,
where no consideration is exchanged between the accountant
and plaintiff, the out-of-pocket rule may not be applicable. 75
The out-of-pocket rule is also not followed where it fails to
provide compensation for damages caused by misrepre-
69. Id. at 173, 178. For a thorough analysis of the court's holding in Florenzano,
see Note, Minnesota Applies Comparative Fault to Negligent Misrepresentation, 13 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 633 (1987).
70. Florenzano, 387 N.W.2d at 175-76, 178.
71. Midland Nat'l Bank of Minneapolis v. Perranoski, 299 N.W.2d 404, 411
(Minn. 1980) (citing Murphy v. Country House, Inc., 307 Minn. 344, 351, 240
N.W.2d 507, 512 (1976)).
72. See Strouth v. Wilkinson, 302 Minn. 297, 300, 224 N.W.2d 511, 514 (Minn.
1974).
73. Lehman v. Hansord Pontiac Co., 246 Minn. 1, 10, 74 N.W.2d 305, 311
(1955); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552B.
74. See Raach v. Haverly, 269 N.W.2d 877, 882 (Minn. 1978) (allowing the value
of plaintiff's labor to be taken into account as consequential damages which were not
contemplated by the parties at the time of the sale).
75. See Lack Indus., Inc. v. Ralston Purina Co., 327 F.2d 266 (8th Cir. 1964).
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sentation. 76
Litigants contesting cases of accountants' misconduct should
keep this possible difference in the measure of damages in
mind when considering the merits of proceeding on theories
of misrepresentation or negligence. 77
IV. FRAUDULENT MISREPRESENTATION
A. Essential Elements
The essential elements of a claim of fraudulent misrepresen-
tation are well-established. 78 This Article will address those el-
ements of the tort of deceit which are of significance to
litigants in accounting cases. Of course, all elements of the
tort must be established by "clear and convincing" evidence -
a higher standard than the normal "preponderance" burden. 79
B. Scienter
The chief distinction between fraudulent misrepresentation
76. Whitney v. Buttrick, 376 N.W.2d 274, 279-81 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985).
77. As noted below, however, third party claimants may have no choice about
limiting their theory of recovery to misrepresentation in view of the possibility that
the privity defense is fully available to accountants charged with mere negligence. See
infra notes 108-111 and accompanying text.
78. The elements are:
1. there must have been a representation;
2. the representation must have been false;
3. the representation must have concerned a past or present fact;
4. the fact must have been material;
5. it must have been susceptible of knowledge;
6. the representer must have known it was false or, in the alternative, must
have asserted it as being true of his own knowledge - without knowing
whether it was true or false;
7. the representer must have intended to have the plaintiff act in reliance
upon his representation;
8. the plaintiff must have been induced to act;
9. the plaintiff's reliance must have been justifiable and reasonable;
10. the plaintiff must suffer damages; and
11. the damage must be the proximate result of the misrepresentation.
Weise v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., 286 Minn. 199, 202-03, 175 N.W.2d 184, 187 (1970);
Davis v. Re-Trac Mfg., 276 Minn. 116, 117, 149 N.W.2d 37, 38-39 (1967). In addi-
tion, to prove the elements of fraudulent misrepresentation, plaintiffs with fraudulent
misrepresentation claims can consider seeking relief under the Minnesota Consumer
Fraud Act, MINN. STAT. § 325F.68 to .70 (1986), which can be asserted against ac-
countants in some circumstances. Jenson v. Touche Ross & Co., 335 N.W.2d 720,
727-28 (Minn. 1983). One significant advantage of this remedy is the availability of
attorney's fees. See MINN. STAT. § 8.31, subd. 3(a) (1986).
79. Weise, 286 Minn. at 203, 175 N.W.2d at 187.
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and negligent misrepresentation lies in the element of intent. 80
To establish a claim of fraudulent misrepresentation, plaintiff
is required to show that the misrepresentation was made with
"fraudulent intent," or in other words, with "dishonesty or
bad faith." 8' As explained in Florenzano:
What the misrepresenter knows or believes is the key to
proof of intent. Wrongful intent, as a state of mind, is
rarely proved directly, e.g., by an admission of bad faith, but
is normally established through circumstantial evidence.
There is no doubt of fraudulent intent where the mis-
representer knows or believes the matter is not as he or she
represents it to be. Fraudulent intent is also present when a
misrepresenter speaks positively and without qualification,
but either is conscious of ignorance of the truth, or realizes
that the information on which he or she relies is not ade-
quate or dependable enough to support such a positive, un-
qualified assertion.
82
C. Future Events
As a general matter, a claim of fraud can only be based upon
representations of past or existing facts.83 Representations
about the future are usually not sufficient bases for fraud ac-
tions.8 4 This is because representations concerning the future
are treated as nothing more than conjecture and opinion.
85
Despite this general rule, an accountant can be found liable for
the expression of opinion concerning future events where the
accountant is relied upon for his expertise concerning the sub-
80. Florenzano, 387 N.W.2d at 173.
81. Id.
82. Id. (citation omitted). The classic and elegant formulation for attributing an
accountant with fraudulent intent is found in State St. Trust Co. v. Ernst, 278 N.Y.
104, 15 N.E.2d 416, 419 (1938). The court stated:
A representation certified as true to the knowledge of the accountants when
knowledge there is none, a reckless misstatement, or an opinion based on
grounds so flimsy as to lead to the conclusion that there was no genuine
belief in its truth, are all sufficient upon which to base liability. A refusal to
see the obvious, failure to investigate the doubtful, if sufficiently gross, may
furnish evidence leading to an inference of fraud so as to impose liability for
losses suffered by those who rely on the balance sheet. In other words,
heedlessness and reckless disregard of consequence may take the place of
deliberate intention.
Id.
83. See Cady v. Bush, 283 Minn. 105, 109, 166 N.W.2d 358, 361 (1969).
84. See id.
85. See id.
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ject of the statement.8 6 An accountant can also be liable for
misrepresentations about present or past facts contained in a
pro forma projection about future events.
8 7
V. POTPOURRI
A. Work Papers
One issue that frequently surfaces during discovery in ac-
counting malpractice cases is whether the accountant or the
client owns financial work papers prepared by the accountant
in the performance of an engagement. Under Minnesota law,
the accountant owns the work papers.88 Even so, an account-
ant's client is entitled to copy an accountant's work papers to
the extent that they "ordinarily constitute part of the client's
books and records and are not otherwise available to the
client." 89
B. Confidentiality
Although no privilege attaches to communications between
an accountant and a client, an accountant cannot disclose "any
confidential information" obtained in the course of a profes-
sional engagement, except with the consent of the client. 90
Disclosure of client confidences may subject an accountant to
liability to his client. 9' This rule does not relieve an account-
ant of his obligation to comply with judicially required disclo-
sure.92 An accountant may even have an affirmative obligation
to disclose confidential information adverse to a client to cer-
tain regulatory authorities.
93
86. Kennedy v. Flo-Tronics, Inc., 274 Minn. 327, 334, 143 N.W.2d 827, 831
(1966); see Perranoski, 299 N.W.2d at 412-13 (the court stated an accountant could be
liable for a statement of opinion of future value if such statement is relied upon for
his expertise on the subject, but held that the third party defendant accountant could
not be held to such expertise).
87. Berg v. Xerxes-Southdale Office Bldg. Co., 290 N.W.2d 612, 615 (Minn.
1980). Consideration here should also be given to the accountants' Code of Profes-
sional Conduct, which prohibits a CPA from permitting his name to be used in con-
nection with a future forecast "which may lead to the belief that the [accountant]
vouches for the achievability of the forecast." Minn. R. 1100.5000.
88. Bonhiver, 311 Minn. at 123, 248 N.W.2d at 299.
89. Minn. R. 1100.5300.
90. Id. 1100.5100.
91. Wagenheim v. Alexander Grant & Co., 190 Ohio App.3d 7, 12, 482 N.E.2d
955, 961 (1983).
92. Minn. R. 1100-5100.
93. See United States v. Authur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 820-21 (1984) (upon
[Vol. 14
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VI. THE ACCOUNTANT'S PRIVITY DEFENSE
A. Introduction
The liability of accountants to third parties94 is an issue of
moment to the profession and to the typical constituents of the
class of persons denoted as third parties, such as creditors and
equity investors. The topic has been the subject of a plethora
of comment.
95
Accountants find the erosion of their immunity from third
party claims especially threatening, due to concern about the
risk of being held liable for damages "in an indeterminate
amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate class."
96
On the other hand, lenders and investors who base financial
decisions upon accountants' opinions are interested in shifting
their risk of loss onto accountants who are likely to have sur-
vived the financial collapse of their client.97 The upheaval in
this area wrought by recent decisons in New Jersey, 98 Wiscon-
sin,99 and California 00 is particularly significant to Minnesota
litigants in light of anomalies in the leading Minnesota case on
point.10' The courts have articulated three distinct rules for
third party claims: the most restrictive traditional rule, 0 2 the
intermediate rule of Section 552 of the Restatement (Second) of
service by the Internal Revenue Service); Natelli, 527 F.2d at 319 (Securities and Ex-
change Commission); Fischer v. Kletz, 266 F. Supp. 180, 183-84 (S.D.N.Y. 1967)
(Securities and Exchange Commision); Bonhiver, 311 Minn. at 129, 248 N.W.2d at
302 (insurance commisioner).
94. The term "third party" is used here to refer to those who do not have con-
tractual privity with the accountant being sued, i.e., non-clients.
95. Exhaustive bibliographies of articles concerning third party liability are con-
tained in: Comment, Extensions of Accountants'Liability for Negligence: One Step Closer to a
New Implied Warranty of Results, 56 U. COLO. L. REV. 265, 265 n.5 (1985); Comment,
Auditors' Liability - Adoption of a Reasonable Foreseeability Standard, 18 U. RICH. L. REV.
221, 221 n.1 (1983).
96. Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 179, 174 N.E. 441,444 (1931); see
also MILLER AND BRADY, supra note 1, at 1.02.
97. N. MINOw, SPECIAL REPORT: ACCOUNTANTS' LIABILITY 2 (1984); Wiener, Com-
mon Law Liabilty of the Certified Public Accountant for Negligent Misrepresentation, 20 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 233 (1983).
98. See H. Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler, 93 N.J. 324, 461 A.2d 138 (1983).
99. See Citizens State Bank v. Timm, Schmidt & Co., 113 Wis. 2d 376, 335
N.W.2d 361 (1983).
100. See International Mortgage Co. v. John P. Butler Accountancy, 177 Cal. App.
3d 806, 223 Cal. Rptr. 218 (1986).
101. See Bonhiver, 311 Minn. at 111, 248 N.W.2d at 291, as discussed in text ac-
companying notes infra 146-63.
102. See infra notes 112-22 and accompanying text.
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Torts,' 0 3 and the expansive rule (or non-rule) of "reasonable
foreseeability." 1o4
B. Effect of Fraudulent Misrepresentation
It is important to note that accountants have no immunity
from reasonably foreseeable third party claims where they have
committed fraudulent misrepresentation, under either the
traditional 0 5 or Restatement 106 positions. This is because a
morally culpable accountant, one who has acted with dishon-
esty or bad faith, is not entitled to special protection from the
tort claims of third parties.1
0 7
C. Liability to Third Parties for Negligence
Although no Minnesota cases have held an accountant liable
to a non-client on a theory of simple negligence, otherjurisdic-
tions have allowed third parties' 0 8 to maintain negligence
claims.' 0 9 Further, Minnesota has allowed third parties to sue
other professionals on negligence theories." t0 The practical
significance of the distinction between negligence and misrep-
resentation theories is now uncertain, in view of the recent rec-
ognition in Minnesota of the tort of negligent misrepre-
sentation. '
103. See infra notes 123-30 and accompanying text.
104. See infra notes 131-45. Another standard was recently posited in Raritan River
Steel Co., 79 N.C. App. at 88-91, 339 S.E.2d at 67-69, but it contemplates liability to a
merely "foreseeable" non-client, and thus appears to be a hybrid of the "reasonably
foreseeable" rule. Finally, the court in Blue Bell, Inc. v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell &
Co., 715 S.W.2d 408 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986), combined approaches by modifying sec-
tion 522 of the Restatement to allow reasonably forseeable third parties to sue account-
ants provided they are members of a limited class. Id. at 412.
105. See Spherex, Inc. v. Alexander Grant & Co., 122 N.H. 898, 451 A.2d 1308
(1982); State St. Trust Co., 278 N.Y. at 112, 15 N.E.2d at 419.
106. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 531.
107. See R. GORMLEY, supra note 23, at 6.02; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 552 comment a.
108. Hereafter, claims against accountants by non-clients, or those who lack con-
tractual privity, will be denoted as "third party claims." The term is not used to refer
to third party defendants as defined in Rule 14 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.
109. See Ryan, 170 N.W.2d at 406-08; Shatterproof Glass Corp. v. James, 466
S.W.2d 873, 877 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971).
110. Marker v. Greenberg, 313 N.W.2d 4 (Minn. 1981) (attorney may be liable to
heirs for neligent estate planning); Waldor Pump, 386 N.W.2d at 377 (engineer may be
held liable in nelgigence).
111. See Florenzano, 387 N.W.2d at 173.
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D. Traditional Rule
Traditionally, accountants have enjoyed limited immunity
from the negligent misrepresentation claims of third parties.
The origins of this doctrine can be traced to the opinion of
Chief Judge Cardozo in Ultramares Corp. v. Touche. 112 Even its
supporters concede that the accountants' privity defense is a
vestige of the once powerful and universal privity limits on tort
liabilty."13 Despite the contentions of critics that the account-
ants' privity defense has outlived its usefulness in an era of
multinational accounting firms, 1 4 the rule has recently been
revitalized in New York,1 5 and elsewhere.11 6 For its part, the
New York court expressed renewed concern about the
"hazards" for accountants of indeterminable liability expo-
sure." l 7 This view recognizes that it is impossible for an ac-
countant to know exactly who will see his opinion once it
leaves his hands, how it will be used, or the length of time dur-
ing which it will be used.
Strictly speaking, the traditional rule does not require literal
contractual privity between an accountant and a plaintiff."l8 In-
stead, it is sufficient that the "end and aim" of the accountant
was to supply, even indirectly, his opinion to a known third
party.1 9 The New York court established these "flexible crite-
ria" as prerequisites for a finding of surrogate privity:
(1) the accountants must have been aware that the financial
reports were to be used for a particular purpose or pur-
poses; (2) in the furtherance of which a known party or par-
112. Ultramares, 255 N.Y. at 179, 174 N.E. at 445. Ultramares and its offspring have
been thoroughly dissected elsewhere. See, e.g., Credit Alliance Corp. v. Arthur An-
dersen & Co., 65 N.Y.2d 536, 536 & n.6, 493 N.Y.S.2d 435, 439 & n.6 (1985).
113. See Credit Alliance, 65 N.Y.2d at 546, 493 N.Y.S.2d at 441.
114. See Wiener, supra note 97, at 244.
115. Credit Alliance, 65 N.Y.2d 536, 493 N.Y.S. 2d 435.
116. See Robertson v. White, 633 F. Supp. 954, 970-71 (W.D. Ark. 1986).
117. Credit Alliance, 65 N.Y.2d at 548, 493 N.Y.S.2d at 441 (citing Ultramares, 225
N.Y. at 179-80, 74 N.E. at 441). Credit Alliance involved the separate claims of two
creditors against the accountants of their debtors. The claim of one creditor was
dismissed because of the lack of any allegation that the accountant prepared financial
statements for the purpose of assisting the plaintiff to extend credit or that the ac-
countant had direct contact with the creditor. Credit Alliance, 65 N.Y.2d at 543, 493
N.Y.S.2d at 437. In contrast, the second creditor was allowed to maintain its claims
because it showed that a primary purpose ("end and aim") of the audited financial
statements was known by the accountant to be the provision of information required
for the extension of credit to the creditor. Id. at 542, 493 N.Y.S 2d at 439.
118. See id at 546, 493 N.Y.S.2d at 441.
119. Id. at 549, 493 N.Y.S.2d at 441.
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ties was intended to rely; and (3) there must have been
some conduct on the part of the accountants linking them
to that party or parties, which evinces the accountants' un-
derstanding of that party or parties' reliance.
120
The New York court laid down the gauntlet and expressly de-
clined to relax its standards to a rule of mere "foreseeability"
- or even to follow the Restatement into the waters of "limited
class" liability. 12' Even so, there was a suggestion in CreditAli-
ance that some judicial interpretations of the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts, Section 552 are "consonant" with the traditional
rule. 1
22
E. Restatement (Second) of Torts, Section 552
A majority of jurisdictions now follow the modified privity
limits of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, Section 552.123 The
Restatement ameliorates the traditional rule by allowing third
parties to sue accountants for negligent misrepresentation,
provided that they belong to a "limited group" and provided
120. Id. at 551, 493 N.Y.S.2d at 443.
121. Id. at 553, 493 N.Y.S.2d at 444.
122. See id. The court reviewed the "flexible approach" of numerous other courts
on the privity defense. The New York Court stressed the elements of privity present
in the decisions of those courts and found support for the view that "surrogate priv-
ity" is a requisite to third party liability. To the extent the decisions of other courts
do not require privity or its surrogate, Credit Alliance stated that they are "clearly dis-
tinguishable" from its rule. Id.
123. Note, H. Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler: A Foreseeably Unreasonable Extention of an
Auditor's Liability, 48 ALBANY L. REV. 876, 889 & n.55 (1984). RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 552, provides:
§ 552. Information Negligently Supplied for the Guidance of Others
(1) One who, in the course of his business, profession or employment, or
in any other transaction in which he has a pecuniary interest, supplies false
information for the guidance of others in their business transactions, is sub-
ject to liability for pecuniary loss caused to them by their justifiable reliance
upon the information, if he fails to exercise reasonable care or competence
in obtaining or communicating the information.
(2) Except as stated in Subsection (3), the liability stated in Subsection (1)
is limited to loss suffered
(a) by the person or one of a limited group of persons for whose bene-
fit and guidance he intends to supply the information or knows that the
recipient intends to supply it; and
(b) through reliance upon it in a transaction that he intends the infor-
mation to influence or knows that the recipient so intends or in a sub-
stantially similar transaction.
(3) The liability of one who is under a public duty to give the information
extends to loss suffered by any of the class of persons for whose benefit the
duty is created, in any one of the transactions in which it is intended to
protect them.
(Vol. 14
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that the accountant had actual knowledge that his professional
opinion would be supplied to the limited group.
1 24
The American Law Institute (ALI) bases its "restricted rule
of liability" on concern about the magnitude of losses posed by
more liberal views. 125 According to the ALI, the duty of care
owed in commercial transactions (which only lead to pecuniary
loss, and not bodily injury), is relative to the use expected with
the circulation of "commercial information."'' 26 It also believes
that public policy favors the unrestricted flow of information
"upon which the operation of the economy rests."' 127
The most important question under Section 552 is the judi-
cial gloss which will be applied to define which third parties
belong to "limited groups" within the meaning of the Restate-
ment. While the shareholders and equity investors in a corpo-
ration may not constitute a limited class, 28 the fact that
members of a "group" are, in fact, few in number may lead a
court to find that a potentially unlimited group satisfies the test
of Section 552.129 The view of the ALI is that lenders do not
comprise a limited class.1
3 0
F. Rule of Reasonable Foreseeability
The accountant's privity defense has been abrogated by re-
cent decisions which allow suits by any third party whose reli-
ance upon an accountant's opinion was reasonably foreseeable
by the accountant.' 3 1 The rejection of the privity defense for
accountants has generated earnest debate and alarm. 132
124. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552(2)(a); see also Aluma Kraft Mfg. Co.
v. Elmer Fox & Co., 493 S.W.2d 378, 382 & n.4 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973); Sphere.,, Inc.,
122 N.H. at 905, 451 A.2d at 1312; Credit Alliance, 65 N.Y.2d at 553, 483 N.E.2d at
444.
125. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 522 comment a.
126. See id.
127. See id.
128. See Briggs v. Sterner, 529 F. Supp. 1155, 1177 (S.D. Iowa 1981); Milliner v.
Elmer Fox & Co., 529 P.2d 806, 807 (Utah 1974).
129. See Merit Ins. Co. v. Colao, 603 F.2d 654, 659 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445
U.S. 929 (1980); Bonhiver, 311 Minn. at 130, 248 N.W.2d at 303.
130. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 522 comment h, illustration 5 (a view
criticized in WIENER, supra note 97, at 252).
131. See H. Rosenblum, Inc., 93 N.J. at 339, 461 A.2d at 145; Citizens State Bank, 113
Wis. 2d at 386, 335 N.W.2d at 366; International Mortgage, 177 Cal. App. 3d at 820,
223 Cal. Rptr. at 827.
132. N. MINow, supra note 97; Bilek, Accountants' Liability to the Third Party and Public
Policy: A Calabresi Approach, 39 Sw. LJ. 689 (1985); Gormley, The Foreseen, the Foresee-
able, and Beyond - Accountants'Liability to Non-Clients, 14 SETON HALL 528 (1984); Skin-
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Proponents of the reasonably foreseeable rule stress that the
accounting profession has become a financially powerful insti-
tution, 133 one uniquely responsible for monitoring the integ-
rity of the marketplace. 34 Others advance the traditional tort
law functions of deterrence, 35 victim compensation, 136 and ef-
ficient risk allocation. 13 7 Critics contend that obviation of the
privity defense is based upon fundamental misconceptions
about the opinions expressed by accountants and their audit
ner, Auditors' Liability - Adoption of a Reasonable Foreseeability Standard, 18 U. RICH. L.
REV. 221 (1983); Wiener, supra note 97, at 250; Note, supra note 123, at 891.
Legislation in Illinois recently restored the privity defense:
No person, partnership or corporation licensed or authorized to practice
under this Act or any of its employees, partners, members, officers or share-
holders shall be liable to persons not in privity of contract with such person,
partnership or corporation, for civil damages resulting from acts, omissions,
decisions or other conduct in connection with professional services per-
formed by such person, partnership or corporation, except for:
(1) such acts, omissions, decisions or conduct that constitute fraud or
intentional misrepresentations, or
(2) such other acts, omissions, decisions or conduct, if such person,
partnership or corporation was aware that a primary intent of the client was
for the professional services to benefit or influence the particular person
bringing the action; provided, however, for the purposes of this subpara-
graph (2), if such person, partnership or corporation (i) identifies in writing
to the client those persons who are intended to rely on the services, and (ii)
sends a copy of such writing or similar statement to those persons identified
in the writing or statement, then such person, partnership or corporation or
any of its employees, be held liable only to such persons intended to so rely,
in addition to those persons in privity of contract with such person, partner-
ship or corporation.
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 11, para. 5535.1 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1987).
133. Wiener, supra note 97, at 251. The oligopolistic tendencies of the profession
are well-documented. See STEVENS, THE BIG EIGHT 7 (1981) (90% of companies on
the NYSE are audited by a "Big Eight" accounting firm).
134. This view is best exemplified by Chief Justice Burger's opinion in United
States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805 (1984):
By certifiying the public reports that collectively depict a corporation's fi-
nancial status, the independent auditor assumes a public responsibility tran-
scending any employment relationship with the client. The independent
public accountant performing this special function owes ultimate allegiance
to the corporation's creditors and stockholders, as well as to the investing
public. This "public watchdog" function demands that the accountant
maintain total independence from the client at all times and requires com-
plete fidelity to the public trust.
Id. at 817.
135. See Citizens State Bank, 113 Wis. 2d at 386-88, 335 N.W.2d at 366.
136. See International Mortgage, 177 Cal App. 3d at 819, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 226.
137. See H. Rosenblum Inc., 93 N.J. at 340-41, 461 A.2d at 146-47. However, none
of these courts or commentators have considered the possiblity that the federal and
state securities laws adequately protect the interests of the average investor in pub-
licly held companies. See id.
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services 38 and upon mistaken analogies between a manufac-
tured product and professional accounting services. 3 9 Con-
cern has also been expressed about the potential unavailability
of accounting services essential to businesses with "high audit
risk," if the privity defense is eliminated.1 40
To the chagrin of accountants, the definition of a foresee-
able third party can be expansive. The most extreme example
is found i*n International Mortgage Co. v. Butler.14 1 In that case, an
accountant audited a mortgage company and issued an unqual-
ified opinion letter on its financial statements. 142 The account-
ant had no knowledge that the plaintiff, a purchaser of
mortgages in the secondary market was to receive the financial
statements, was planning to rely on the financial statement -
or even that the plaintiff existed.' 43 Nonetheless, the interme-
138. Gormley, supra note 132, at 552; N. MINOW, supra note 97, at 5. An account-
ant who expresses an unqualified, or "clean," opinion on the financial statements of a
client after an audit merely certifies that the client's financial records were selectively
examined in accordance with generally accepted accounting standards, and have
been presented in accordance with generally accepted auditing principles. J. BURTIN,
R. PALMER & R. KEY, HANDBOOK OF ACCOUNTING AND AUDITING 16-2 (1981).
Accountants do not undertake an audit for the primary prupose of detecting
fraud by the audit client or its employees. See R. GORMLEY, supra note 1, at
§ 3.02[1][a]. Instead, the balance sheet and income statement are intended to reflect
the financial position of the company and compare it on a consistent basis with prior
periods to show whether it is making progress. S. Ross, THE ELUSIVE ART OF Ac-
COUNTING 34 (1966).
In contrast, 37% of the shareholders of public companies believe that auditors
examine all of the financial records of a client and 66% believe that an audit is con-
ducted mainly to discover fraud. OPINION RESEARCH CORP., PUBLIC ACCOUNTING IN
TRANSITION 47-48 (1974). Judge Wiener shares this belief. Wiener, supra note 97, at
258.
139. N. MINOw, supra note 97, at 5:
The accountant differs from the auto manufacturer in many important re-
spects. An auditor does not have absolute knowledge of and control over a
company's finances and records in the same way that an auto manufacturer
has knowledge of and control over its production process. The auditor does
have control over his or her examination of a client's financial statement,
but the relationship between the statement and a claimed loss is far more
indirect than the relationship between a defective product and a claimed
harm.
Id.
140. Briggs, 529 F. Supp. at 1177; see N. MINOW, supra note 97, at 5 ("daring en-
trepreneurial ventures that our economy so desperatetly needs, including experi-
mental, high-tech companies."); Note, United States v. Arthur Young & Co.: Judicial
Death Knell for Auditors' Pnvilege and Suggested Congressional Resolution, 71 CORNELL L.
REV. 694, 696 (1986).
141. 177 Cal. App. 3d 806, 223 Cal. Rptr. 218 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
142. Id. at 809, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 219.
143. Id.
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diate California Court of Appeals held that the accountant
could be liable, stating:
An independent auditor (as opposed to an in-house ac-
countant) is employed to analyze a client's financial status
and make public the ultimate findings in accord with recog-
nized accounting principles. Such an undertaking is im-
bued with considerations of public trust, for the accountant
must well realize the finished product, the unqualified finan-
cial statement, will be relied upon by creditors, stockhold-
ers, investors, lenders, or anyone else involved in the financial
concerns of the audited client.'
44
The only apparent doctrinal limitation on an accountant's
exposure to third parties under the "reasonably foreseeable"
standard is that the user of the accountant's work product must
do so for a proper business purpose. 45
G. Bonhiver v. Graff
The question facing litigants in Minnesota is whether Minne-
sota has adopted Section 552 of the Restatement or the rule of
reasonable foreseeability. While many commentators assume
that Minnesota adopted Section 552 in Bonhiver,i46 a close
reading reveals that the court, though heavily influenced by
Section 552, did not expressly adopt the Restatement.147 In-
deed, one of the holdings in Bonhiver is anomalous with Section
552.148 Recently, the Minnesota court declined to go further
than to state that Section 552 "parallels" Minnesota law. 149
In Bonhiver, an accountant was hired to bring an insurance
company's books "up to date."1 50 The accountant negligently
made inaccurate entries into the client's books and negligently
prepared other work papers during the course of his engage-
ment.15 1 The accountant was not hired to do an audit and did
144. Id. (emphasis added).
145. See Note, supra note 123, at 902; Comment, The Enlarging Scope of Auditors'
Liability to Relying Third Parties, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 281 (1983).
146. Note, supra note 123, at 889; Note, Extensions of Accountants' Liability for
Nelgience: One Step Closer to a New Implied Warranty of Results, 56 UNIV. CoLo. L. REV.
265, 271 (1985); see R. GORMLEY, supra note 1, at § 6.01[3] n.32 and 33.
147. Bonhiver, 311 Minn. at 131, 248 N.W.2d at 299.
148. R. GORMLEY, supra note 1, at 547. "The most egregious example of the spe-
cifically foreseen limited class rule is the Minnesota case ofBonhiver v. Graf, in which
the term was distorted beyond recognition." Id.
149. Florenzano, 387 N.W.2d at 176.
150. Bonhiver, 311 Minn. at 115, 248 N.W.2d at 295.
151. Id.
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not prepare a financial statement. Instead, the accountant ex-
hibited some inaccurate financial work papers to representa-
tives of the state insurance commissioner who were
investigating the financial condition of the insurance
company. 1
52
One issue in Bonhiver was whether the accountant could be
liable to the insurance commissioner for merely showing infor-
mal work papers to the commissioner's agents. 5 3 The court
ruled that the accountant was liable to the commissioner, a
third party, because the accountant had "actual knowledge"
that the commissioner was relying upon the accountant's rep-
resentation. 154 The court's opinion stressed that the account-
ant had actual knowledge of the commissioner's reliance no
fewer than eight times. 155
The trouble with interpreting Bonhiver is that the court also
found the accountant liable to general insurance agents for the
insurance company who, at best, indirectly relied upon the ac-
countant's work papers in continuing to sell insurance at a time
when the insurance company was insolvent.156 The agents
claimed they had relied upon representations by the insurance
commissioner about the solvency of the insurance company
and that the insurance commissioner, in turn, had relied upon
the representations of the accountant. 57 In other words, the
Bonhiver court was faced with a claim for damages by third par-
ties whose reliance was indirect and was not directly foreseen
by the accountant. In ruling that the general agents were enti-
tled to recover, the court seems to have ruled, sub silentio, that
the insurance commissioner was the alter ego of the agents,
entitling them to stand in the commissioner's shoes under Sec-
tion 552.158
Since the insurance agents did not constitute a foreseen lim-
ited group within any objective view of Section 552(2)(a), the
Bonhiver court offered this apologia:
[T]he extent of an accountant's liability for malpractice is
152. Id. at 115, 248 N.W.2d at 295.
153. Id. at 120, 248 N.W.2d at 298.
154. Id. at 121, 248 N.W.2d at 298.
155. Id. at 115, 121, 123, and 128, 248 N.W.2d at 295, 298, 299, and 302.
156. Id. at 128, 248 N.W.2d at 302.
157. Id.
158. Id. (the court also stated that the accountant's "liability arguably should ex-
tend to the injured policy-holders under § 552").
1988]
25
Shroyer: Accountants and the Dynamics of Duty
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1988
WILLIAM MITCHELL LA JV REVIEW
not settled. If that liability is to be drawn somewhere short
of foreseeability, it must be drawn on pragmatic grounds
alone. Once it is admitted that a certain number of people
have been injured as a result of an accountant's malpractice,
there is no logical justification for denying any of them re-
lief based upon the "limited" or "unlimited" nature of their
"class," or whether the reliance of the particular injured
parties was or was not "specifically foreseeable."
Wherever the line will eventually be drawn between those
who can recover from the negligent accountant and those
who cannot, we feel that on the facts of this case [the insur-
ance agent] falls on the side of those who can recover.' 59
In sum, Bonhiver left the door ajar for litigants to contend
that Minnesota adheres to an ad hoc and "pragmatic" privity
defense for accountants, with the possibility that the claims of
any reasonably foreseeable third party are actionable. Support
for this argument can be gleaned from the decision in Marker v.
Greenberg,'60 where the court adopted a "foreseeability" analy-
sis in disposing of a non-client's claim against an attorney.1
6i
The lesson of Bonhiver is that accountants and third parties
should be prepared to adduce evidence of "pragmatic
grounds" favoring their positions on the privity defense when
the next third party claim reaches the appellate level in
Minnesota. 1
62
CONCLUSION
Persons who litigate the common law liability of accountants
in Minnesota face uncertainty about the viability and scope of
the privity defense. Bonhiver v. Graft analyzed the privity de-
fense within the rubric of Section 552 of the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts, but may have stretched its actual holding to the
liability zone of the "reasonably foreseeable." The court ex-
159. Id., 248 N.W.2d at 302-03 (citations omitted).
160. Marker, 313 N.W.2d at 5.
161. Id.
162. The Wisconsin court specifically determined that final resolution of the priv-
ity defense would be postponed until after the facts of the case were "fully explored"
at trial. Citizens State Bank, 113 Wis. 2d at 335 N.W.2d at 366. It is not clear whether
the facts to be "explored" included evidence of the competing public policy positions
on the privity defense. Subsequently, the case has been interpreted as holding that
lack of privity is not a bar to a third party claim. Costa v. Neiman, 123 Wis. 2d 410,
366 N.W.2d 896 (1985).
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plicitly stated that the line demarcating an accountant's liability
to third parties "will be drawn" in the future on the basis of
"pragmatic grounds alone."' 63 The wise will heed this dictum
in presenting future cases - and live for the nonce in the
shadow of uncertainty.
163. Bonhiver, 311 Minn. at 128-31, 248 N.W.2d at 302-03.
27
Shroyer: Accountants and the Dynamics of Duty
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1988
28
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 14, Iss. 1 [1988], Art. 3
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol14/iss1/3
